The question asked in this study is whether a person evaluates himself differently when a failure by him is known by another person, than when his failure is not known by another. Further, the question is asked: does the degree of expertness of the observer determine a person's evaluation of himself?
To answer these questions, a laboratory experiment was conducted.^"
The subjects were 128 male undergraduates of the University of Michigan.
As each arrived in the laboratory at his appointed time, the experimenter escorted him directly to a private cubicle. He remained in this cubicle throughout the experiment and therefore did not see any other subjects.
The experimenter first gave him a questionnaire designed to measure several personality attributes. In addition, the questionnaire obtained a measure of the subject's confidence in psychology, its tests and its practitioners. The experimenter left the subject alone while he filled out the questionnaire. Next, the experimenter told the subject he was to perform two tasks prior to his participating later in the socalled "real" part of the experiment (about which he was told nothing and which did not actually occur). The subject was told that performing these tasks was solely for the purpose of helping him when he participated in the later or "real" parts of the experiment. These instructions were given in order to motivate the subject to perform his tasks and, at the same time, to make it seem plausible if no one checked his performance on the task. The first task was presented as a test of visual-motor coordination, which was described to the subjects as the ability to imagine the arrangements of shapes and forms and to manipulate these shapes as they were imagined. The test consisted of a jig-saw puzzle with no picture on it. The criterion of success given the subjects was total completion of the puzzle.
However, such completion was impossible, so that all of the subjects failed and knew that they had done so. The criterion for the degree of failure was said by the experimenter to be the extent to which the subjects approximated the correct way of putting the pieces together, ^ince there was not such a way, the subjects had no objective cues as to the extent of their failure. The subject next rated himself, on 11-point scales, on a series of 13 traits. The traits were presented to the subjects in the order of relevance or similarity to the task and to visual motor coordination.
The traits rated first were those which were most similar to visual motor coordination; those rated last were least relevant to the experimental task.
The order of similarity was determined from a separate study on a sample comparable to the one used in the present study.
The results are as follows: First, it was found that a person whose failure is public lowers his evaluations of his performance more than does one whose failure is private. To obtain this result, the responses of subjects in both the public expert and public non-expert conditions were combined in order to give one mean for the two public conditions. The replies of subjects in the two private conditions were similarly combined.
The difference between these means was significant by a t test at the .001 level.
A second finding is that the subjects in the public-non-expert condition rated themselves lower than did subjects in the private-nonexpert condition. This difference was significant by a t test at .001.
Thus, it seems that subjects evaluate their failure as being greater when they fail in public than when they fail in private, but this is especially true when their audience is a non-expert.
A third finding is that the subjects rate their general skill in visual 
